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Introduction: 
The former president of the United States George Bush gave a speech after the beginning of the 
Iraq War in 2003. There he said that “lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance” 
and “if the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution (...) a trend of conflict and fear 
will be ended” (Bush, 2003). Obviously, George Bush believed in the stabilizing powers of 
democracy. Those ideas about democracy, especially from the Bush administration, are based on 
democratic peace theory (Ish-Shalom, 2006, p. 584). This theory tries to explain the pattern that 
democratic states seem to be very peaceful towards each other. The proponents of this theory 
even claim that democratic states have never fought a war against each other. As an explanation 
for this seemingly prevailing peace among democratic states, the proponents of that theory argue 
that it is due to factors inherent to democracy, such as institutional constraints or peaceful conflict 
resolutions. 
However, it is also been largely stressed in the empirical literature about democratic peace 
theory, that although democratic states don’t go to war against each other, they are as war-prone 
as any other state. So an explanation of the peace between democratic states should also provide 
for this. There are also scientists that try to find other explanations that might give a more 
sufficient explanation for the prevailing peace among a certain group of states than the 
democratic peace does. 
         Another theory which has assumptions about a state’s war or peace behavior, is the theory 
of Samuel Huntington who argues about a ‘clash of civilizations’ in the post-Cold War period. 
Following his theory, the biggest wars in the 21st century will be fought between states of 
different civilizations, especially among the fault lines of these civilizations. From both theories 
there can be deduced expectations that are about the perception of the public by one state of a 
foreign state in determining a positive or negative picture of that state. In this research, the goal is 
to look at public opinion data to find evidence that supports or overturns both theories and to see 
which theory can be applied more sufficient in accounting for the perception of the public 
opinion about another state. 
         The research question will be: can regime type give a more sufficient explanation for the 
public perception of one state about a foreign state than civilization membership? Public opinion 
data from 39 countries will be used from the Pew Research Center. The findings show that 
regime type gives a more stable explanation in categorizing public opinions about other states. 
The categories that were created following the clash of civilizations thesis were not significant 
for all dependent variables. 
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Literature review: 
What is democratic peace theory? It argues that democratic states don’t go to war with one 
another (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 624). This theory is initially rooted in an essay by Immanuel 
Kant, which he wrote in 1795. Kant explained that the emergence of liberal democratic republics 
with chosen representative bodies will eventually result in a ‘perpetual peace’ (Kant, 1795/2004, 
pp. 64-66). This essay of Kant didn’t receive much attention until the 1970’s (Hayes, 2012, pp. 
767-768). In that time period his idea got more attention and there were scholars that tried to 
show with statistical tests that democratic states indeed had never fought a war against each 
other. For example Dean Babst (1964), who investigated for the U.S. government. He found that 
states with an elected, independent government haven’t fought each other in the time period 
1789-1941 (Babst, 1964, p. 10). 
 After Babst, there have been more large-N statistical tests examining war data. Most of 
these studies try to find evidence for the democratic peace phenomenon by looking at pairs of 
states (dyads) over a long time period, to see if the dyads that are democratic, are significantly 
less likely to go to war than dyads that are not fully democratic (Bremer, 1992; Small & Singer, 
1976; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Rummel, 1983; Doyle, 1983). Hayes argues these studies resulted 
in “a general consensus that a statistically significant zone of peace exists between democracies, 
although that consensus is attended by healthy debate” (Hayes, 2012, p. 771). The bulk of the 
literature about the democratic peace goes in depth about the possible causal mechanisms trying 
to explain the democratic peace. Before these will be discussed, it is very important to note that 
although democracies don’t fight each other, they do fight other states. In general, democracies 
are just as war-prone as authoritarian regimes (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 624). So the causal 
mechanisms trying to explain the democratic peace should also account for this. 
     There are two major explanations for the democratic peace. The first explanation is based 
on the idea by Kant and is called the normative approach. This approach argues that democracies 
externalize their domestic political norms to the international level (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 
625; Morgan, 1993, p. 198; Gaubatz, 1996, p. 136). Those domestic norms hold the civil rights 
most common in democratic states, such as nonviolent debate based on freedom of speech and 
association and that winning the elections doesn’t mean eliminating the opposition. This creates 
an atmosphere of ‘live and let live’ (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625). When a democracy faces 
another democracy they will not fight each other, because they will treat each other with trust and 
respect and try to settle their problems in a nonviolent manner (Gaubatz, 1996, 122). 
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         The second approach is the institutional approach. This holds that typical democratic 
institutions and processes make decision-makers accountable to the public and a whole range of 
social groups (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 626; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 791). In a 
democracy the democratic leaders are monitored and can be sanctioned if their policies went 
wrong or are not in favour by the public, which is called elite accountability (Rosato, 2003, p. 
587).  Other mechanisms resulting from democratic accountability are, inter alia, public 
constraint, slow mobilization of large armies, slow policymaking or transparency (Hayes, 2012, 
p. 773). 
In sum, the democratic peace proponents argue that due to institutional constraints in 
democratic states or/and peaceful conflict resolutions between democratic states they are less 
war-prone against each other, than against states with a different type of regime. So for 
democratic peace theorists, regime type is the explaining factor for the peace that prevails among 
states with a liberal democratic regime.  
However, these explanations also face critique. An important critique on the institutional 
approach is that this approach doesn’t account for the fact that the nature of the democratic peace 
is dyadic (Hayes, 2012, 773). It are only democratic dyads that seem more peaceful than other 
sort of dyads. This means that the causal mechanism should focus more on the overlapping 
effects of democratic states. The institutional approach focuses too much on what happens within 
one state, which constraints him from going to war with another state, independent of what 
regime type that other state might be. So following this approach democracies should be in 
general less likely to go to war or start one. While by contrast, it is statistically proven that 
democracies participate in just as much wars as any other state. This means that there is 
something in the nature of the interaction, the overlapping effect, between democracies which 
creates the peace (Hayes, 2012, 773). The institutional approach can’t provide a sufficient causal 
mechanism for this. 
Furthermore, as Rousseau et al. (Rousseau et al, 2004, 526-527) point out, one therefore 
shouldn’t look at monadic explanations when trying to find a causal mechanism for the 
democratic peace. As most of the researchers that promote the institutional approach do wrong, is 
that these approaches look too much at how the regime type and its consequences, influences the 
decision process in that state and creates their international behaviour. What would mean that 
democracies do not go to war with one another (Müller & Wolff, 2004, 5). However, most of 
these explanations can’t explain why democratic states in general are as war-prone as 
nondemocratic states. The institutional approach should have focused more on the interaction that 
happens between democratic states, and not just regarding one democratic state. 
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More, Farber and Gowa (1997) argue against the statistical significance of the democratic 
peace as stressed by large-N studies of proponents. They stress that it is only in the Cold War 
period that democratic states are significantly less likely to go to war against each other, than 
other pairs of states (Farber & Gowa, 1997, p. 414. The Cold War period included 65,7% of the 
total dyad-years from 1815 until the present. Therefore, large empirical studies focusing on this 
period are not reliable since the whole period is influenced by the Cold War period.  
Spiro (1994, p. 51) and Mearsheimer (1990, p. 50) go even further, by arguing that peace 
between states is by far more common than war and democracies were few in number over the 
past two centuries. Most of the large-N empirical arguments for the democratic peace find a 
relation between democracy and peace, but that relation is not significant (Spiro, 1994, p. 76). 
For example, it could also be true that states whose name begin with the letter ‘K’ have never 
fought a war against each other, but that doesn’t make it a ‘states whose name begin with the 
letter ‘K’ peace’ (Owen, 1994, p. 88). Thus, democratic peace proponents do face some critique 
and it really is the question whether regime type is an explaining factor for peaceful relations 
between states or perceptions of states. 
Because the democratic peace proponents seem to face criticism by many 
counterarguments, another theory that has gained more influence in the IR field and also in the 
democratic peace literature, can maybe provide a more sufficient explanation for peaceful 
relations and perceptions between democratic states. This field is the importance of social culture 
and specifically the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis from Samuel Huntington (Henderson, 2004, p. 
539; Huntington, 1993).  Samuel Huntington’s article from 1993 has been the subject of a great 
debate, since it is one of the most cited articles ever of the Foreign Affairs magazine. This is 
because Huntington has a thesis which is basically about a prediction of conflict in the 21
st
 
century. His thesis holds that conflict is more likely to occur among nations or groups of different 
civilizations and that the biggest conflicts that could occur, would be among the fault lines of the 
civilizations (Huntington, 1997, pp. 24-25). For example, Huntington predicted that the Ukraine 
would split up, because that state was on the fault line of two civilizations (Huntington, 1997, 
34). 
What is a civilization according to Huntington? He based his theory on the ‘study of 
history’ from Arnold Toynbee (1950), who gave an analysis of the complete history of modern 
human beings through the context of rising and falling civilizations. A civilization is the widest 
possible cultural entity. It is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of 
cultural identity that people have, besides from being all human (Huntington, 1997, 41). So being 
in a civilization gives a feeling of connection with other people from the same civilization that 
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overrides state borders, because it is the most basic connection people can have. Huntington 
identifies nine civilizations in the present world, which are: Western, Latin-American, African, 
Islamic, Chinese, Hindu, Orthodox-Eastern, Buddhist and Japanese (Huntington, 1997, pp. 22-
23). Furthermore, he divides the civilizations through history, language, culture, tradition and the 
most important one: religion. Four out of the five major world religions are associated with big 
civilizations (Huntington, 1997, 46). Huntington thinks that religion will be more important in the 
21st century, and therefore religion is the most important variable for determining a state’s 
membership of a civilization. As Henderson (2004, 542) points out, Huntington’s theory and his 
predictions about conflict are closely related to cultural realism. This holds that cultural factors 
are an important underlying motif of a state’s foreign policy and therefore people from different 
cultures, or in Huntington’s eyes civilizations, are more likely to engage in war with another. 
There are authors who have put the democratic peace theory in light of the clash of 
civilizations thesis. Johns and Davies (2012) did interesting research in how the public of two 
states from the Western civilization, Great Britain and the U.S., consider states with a different 
religion from another civilization. They did this on the micro-level of individual perceptions of 
the public by an experiment. The public was being polled of the two democratic states and was 
asked questions about the readiness to go to war with other hypothetical states, regarding regime 
type (democratic or authoritarian regime) and dominant faith (Islam or Christian). They found 
that the public from both states is readier to take action against Islamic states than against 
Christian states as well as against authoritarian regimes than democratic states (Johns & Davies, 
2012, p. 1049). 
 Henderson (2004) tested the relative strength of the clash of civilizations thesis against 
the democratic peace theory in accounting for the incidence of international conflict. He found 
that Huntington’s thesis also applies to the Cold War period and civilizational conflict among a 
fault line was more statistically significant than regime type (Henderson, 2004, p. 553). Russett, 
Oneal and Cox, (2000) investigated militarized interstate disputes from 1950 until 1992 with a 
large-N study. They concluded that civilizational differences during that period couldn’t explain 
much about the likelihood of two states going to war with each other (Russett et al. 2000, p. 602). 
The problem with the study from Henderson (2004) and from Russett et al. (2000) is that they did 
their research in the Cold War period. Huntington explicitly writes that his theory isn’t about that 
period (Huntington, 1997, p. 16), because in this period there was a bipolar structure. His theory 
is about a multipolar system in which not one or two civilizations dominate the world. 
There are a lot of critiques on Huntington’s theory. For example by Henderson & Tucker 
(2001, p. 328), who found that in the years after the Cold War, states were more likely to go to 
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war with a state from their own civilization than they were against states from different 
civilizations. Also by Said (2001, p. 12), who argues that there are too many internal dynamics 
and differences inside civilizations to argue for an overarching civilization. It is also often 
stressed that the civilization structure is not a coherent one and that civilizations are no unity 
(Kader, 1998, p. 89). Fox (2002, p. 433) found no evidence in the period from 1990-1998 for an 
increasing trend of civilizational conflict in comparison to non-civilizational conflicts. Even 
more, the most ethnic conflicts occur inside civilizations (Fox, 2002, p. 433). Although 
Huntington’s theory seems in a way convincing for explaining peace and conflict in the post-
Cold war period, it is attended by some heavy criticism. Just like democratic peace theory. 
 
Theoretical puzzle and research question: 
The connection between both theories is that democratic peace theory is for a part about the 
recognition by a state of another state’s regime type (Geva & Hanson, 1999, 805). From the 
explanations of the democratic peace, it follows that democratic states perceive other democratic 
states as more peaceful, because they know that the other state is democratic. Therefore, the state 
knows that the other state has the same accountability and democratic constraints which stops 
him from being very aggressive (Braumoeller, 1997, 397). Furthermore, following the normative 
argument, when two democratic states connect they will create a zone of shared trust, respect and 
nonviolent debate (Maoz & Russett, 1993, 625). However, when a democratic state interacts with 
a nondemocratic state, this will lead to a more aggressive perception. Due to the fact that in 
nondemocratic regimes political conflicts will be solved by violence and coercion. This creates 
an atmosphere of mistrust and fear in the international level around that state, and thus a more 
aggressive perception by a democratic state of that regime (Maoz & Russett, 1993, 625).  
Doyle (1983) puts this argument the best: “domestically just republics, which rest on 
consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of 
accommodation” (Doyle, 1983, p. 230). So one can expect a democratic state perceiving another 
democratic state as trust- and peaceful, while perceiving a non-democratic state as distrustful and 
not applying its democratic norms. 
The cultural argument that Huntington and Henderson make is that differences among the 
civilizations are the most fundamental factor in determining one’s perception of another state 
(Huntington, 1993, 25). They argue that, especially in the 21st century, as said earlier, the 
importance of a state’s broadest cultural background will determine whether it will construct its 
perception of a state as aggressive or not. Specifically, states of different civilizations that lie next 
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to each other. Therefore, if a state from civilization A has to perceive a state from civilization B, 
and they are geographically located next to each other, the state from civilization A will perceive 
the other state as a potential threat. By reason of their highest cultural identity will differ and 
since Huntington claims that “the fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and 
ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed” (Huntington, 
1993, p. 29), there have to be some aggressive perception between those states. So in short, there 
will be a rise in ethnic conflict between states from different civilizations and/or states from 
different civilizations that are closely located among each other. 
Following these points the democratic peace and the ‘clash of civilizations’ clearly have 
different assumptions about the peaceful or aggressive perceptions of a state regarding a foreign 
state. As specified above, the assumptions they hold are contradictory. It are these assumptions 
that will be cleared out to see which theory can better explain the perceptions from a state of a 
foreign state, because this is important for explaining peaceful or aggressive relations among 
states. The main research question will be: Can regime type give a more sufficient explanation 
for the public perception of a state about a foreign state than civilization membership? This 
question will shed light on the perception of a democratic state on another democratic state and 
on the perception of a democratic state on a nondemocratic state. Furthermore, this will also shed 
light on the perception of states from two different civilizations. From both theories can be 
extracted expectations that will be examined to answer the research question. 
  
Level of analysis: 
Different levels of analysis can be taken, but for this research the micro-level of the public is 
taken. The normative explanation from the democratic peace has a part about the public opinion 
in perceiving another state. The main assumption is that democratic publics will be more peaceful 
towards each other than to other states (Owen, 1994, p. 100). That is because war costs lives and 
money and the public, in case of a big war,  needs to pay the price. Therefore, the public plays a 
role in considering whether to go to war or not, as well as in democracies as in authoritarian 
regimes (Owen, 1994, p. 100). Furthermore as Geva and Hanson (1999) point out, “political 
explanations of democratic peace also recognize the importance of the public in calculus of the 
use of force” (Geva & Hanson, 1999, p. 805). So, for the perception of the peacefulness or 
aggressiveness by one state of another state the perception of the public will be examined. Thus 
the public opinion. 
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 Tomz and Weeks (2013, p. 862) argued that the public differentiates between democratic 
states and nondemocratic states in determining the threat another state can pose on their own 
state. Furthermore, they note as well that morality plays an important role in the threat 
perception. If the public from a democratic state perceives a foreign state, this perception is 
influenced by the regime type of that other state (Tomz and Weeks, 2013, p. 860). In the case of a 
public from a democratic state who perceives another democratic state, this public probably takes 
into account the fact that the other state is a just and on consent based democracy as its own. 
Therefore the public will overall assume that this other democratic state deserves not an 
aggressive line, but one of accommodation and compromise (Doyle, 1983, p. 230).  
Secondly, the importance of public opinion is that in a full democratic state, policies 
should rest on public opinion (Glynn et al, 1999, p. 6). It is however a discussion how much of 
their opinion should be concluded in the policy of a state, due to an informational gap of the 
public. Furthermore, in a representative democracy, the public can provide checks and balances 
on the representatives. First, because the representatives are chosen by the citizens (Glynn et al, 
1999, p. 7). This already suggests that the chosen leaders govern the state by opinions that are in 
agreement with the citizens that choose the leaders. This is an indirect influence that public 
opinion has on policy-making. There is also a direct influence, namely that the public can set 
public officials out of office, if they totally don’t agree with the representative’s chosen policy 
(Glynn et al. 1999, pp. 7-8). So, in a proper democratic state the public opinion is of importance 
in the policy-making process and thus also in the foreign policy-making process.  
Similarly, this applies in sort of the same way to nondemocratic states. Many 
nondemocratic states are underpinned by the mass opinion when dealing with security (Welzel 
and Inglehart, 2009, pp. 131-132). This is because those nondemocratic regimes are stable, when 
there is an underlying agreement of the population of the security policy of the regime. In the 
worst case, it has been shown by Schock (in: Welzel & Inglehart, 2009, p. 132) that 
nondemocratic regimes can’t always suppress opposition, and when it grows too large, chances 
are that the regime can get overthrown. Therefore, public opinion is also important for 
nondemocratic states. 
         Furthermore, public opinion polling is also important because, if done well, it provides 
clues about a state’s culture and the value its citizens have (Glynn et al. 1999, p. 8). So, this is a 
good argument for taking the public opinion as level of analysis to test the theory of the ‘clash of 
civilizations’, since this theory is also about the public’s culture. It is about people with the same 
religion and historical background, across the level of states. And since the public has influence 
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on the policy in a democratic state as well as in a nondemocratic state, it can give important clues 
about the cultural similarities across the national boundaries.  
 More important, it is also necessary to look at public opinion in perceiving other cultural 
entities, following Inglehart (1988, p 1205), because cultural differences between states can have 
crucial political consequences. It is therefore important to look at public opinion because 
ultimately what the public does and thinks, is what is the culture of a given state. So for these 
reason, it is also important for the civilizational category to look at the opinion of the public. 
 The most used definition of public opinion is public opinion as an aggregation of 
individual opinions (Glynn et al. 1999, p. 17). The public opinion of a state is then the sum of 
many individual opinions of a random selected sample. This is also what will be used for this 
inquiry. Further details about which surveys will be used, will be stressed under ‘data and 
research design’. 
  
Expectations and operationalizing: 
Hypotheses will not be used in this research. This due to the reason that the theories have brought 
different assumptions and it are these that will be cleared out. The data that will be used can’t 
provide that much information as to totally accept or reject the assumptions. Therefore the 
assumptions will not be translated into hypotheses, but in expectations. Then, these expectations 
will be examined in the data. From the normative democratic peace approach, there can be 
extracted one expectation, which mostly is about a state’s regime type and which shall be named 
‘expectation 1’ and reads: the public from democratic states will perceive other democratic states 
as more peaceful than they will perceive nondemocratic states or than publics from 
nondemocratic states will perceive other states. This last part is about the fact that democratic 
dyads are more peaceful towards each other than other sort of dyads. 
From Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory, there can be extracted two expectations. 
Expectation 2: The public from a civilization will perceive states from other civilizations as more 
aggressive than states from their own civilization. And expectation 3: The public from a state that 
is on a fault line between civilizations will perceive neighbouring states from another civilization 
as more aggressive than the public from a state that does not lie on a fault line.  
As a civilization, the distinction that Huntington made according to his map of the world 
will be taken into account (Huntington, 1997, pp. 22-23). He takes as most important factor for 
determining which state is in which civilization, the dominant religion of the state (Huntington, 
1993, 25). As stressed earlier these civilizations are: Western, Latin American, Japanese, 
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Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, African and Buddhist. The respondents in the surveys that 
will be used for this thesis, will be categorized according to their civilization membership. This 
categorization can be seen in table A in the appendix, which contains all the states that were 
surveyed and with their categorization according to their regime type, civilization membership. 
Huntington is not very clear about what he exactly means by fault line. He does not give a 
precise definition, besides that it is the crossing line of neighbouring states that are from different 
civilizations (Huntington, 1997, p. 225). However, does this also include sea borders? And if yes, 
what is the range for this? This is important because it raises for example the question whether 
Japan is on a fault line with China or with Russia. For this argument, Japan will be seen as on a 
fault line with China, and with Russia. The same will be done for the U.S. and Russia, Turkey 
and Russia, and the Philippines and China. The reason for this is that the distance between those 
states from the sea is simply not that much and they are all big military powers. They have the 
capability to easily bridge the distance with military forces. 
         For the fault line expectation will also be made an independent categorical variable. A 
division is made per question between states that are on a fault line between the civilization of the 
state in the question, or states that are not. So for example, if a question is about the perception on 
the U.S., then a variable will be made where all states are divided in either from a different 
civilization and on a fault line with the U.S. or not on a fault line with the U.S. So it will be 
divided according to the state in the particular question and whether the respondents of other 
states are on a fault line with that particular state or not.  
Then, what is regime type? Conceptually, a regime type refers firstly to the type of 
government a state has. Following Hague & Harrop (2013, p.4) “a government consists of 
institutions responsible for making collective decisions for society. More narrowly, government 
refers to the top political level within such institutions”. There are then several classifications for 
the type of government, the regime, a state can have, but the clearest is the classification of states 
as liberal democracies or as authoritarian (Hague & Harrop, 2013, 9). Under authoritarian also 
falls a competitive authoritarian regime, like Russia, and holds that there are elections, but these 
aren’t fair and transparent. A liberal democracy is a state where there are free and open elections 
with the passive and active right to vote for almost the entire population. There is an independent 
role for the media (Dahl, 1998, 39). In an authoritarian regime, there are no elections and the 
leaders have no accountability to their people (Hague & Harrop, 2013, 9).  
To categorize the states that will be used in this research, the Polity IV project will be 
used (Marshall et al, 2014, pp. 14-17). This ranges from -10 as a full autocracy to +10 as a full 
democracy. In the Polity IV project, states are divided into six categories, namely: full 
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democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, autocracy or failed. The Polity IV 
project has the same definition of democracy such as Dahl (Marshall et al, 2014, p. 14). In this 
argument, a dichotomous independent variable will be made for this regime type, because that 
provides the best answer for the research question and expectations. It is about whether there can 
be made a sufficient classification for states as democratic or nondemocratic. So therefore, there 
will be used only two categories to classify a state’s regime. These categories are: democratic or 
nondemocratic. Under democratic falls ‘full democracy’ and ‘democracy’, which are states that 
score +6 or higher and the scale of the Polity project. Under nondemocratic falls everything that 
is not a democracy, so everything under +6 until -10. 
However, the Polity IV dataset noted  per state whether a state has a period of 
factionalism. Factionalism refers to a state where competition among political groups is intense, 
hostile and often violent (Marshall, et al. 2014, pp. 2-3). Because such states can have a 
democratic score of +6, they are not democratic in the way as is meant in the democratic peace 
literature, because factionalism often leads to hardly polarized and uncompromising competition 
between different political blocs (Gurr et al, 1999, p. 196). The definition of democratic peace 
proponents argue that a democratic state should have a peaceful conflict resolution mechanism 
(Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 625). Therefore, the states that deal with factionalism in the year 2013 
will also be defined in this research as nondemocratic. These states are: Czech Republic, 
Lebanon, Bolivia, Malaysia and Pakistan. With this categorization, it is more clear to evaluate 
whether regime type had any influence on the perception of the public from democratic states of 
other states. 
 
Data and research design: 
The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that conducts public opinion surveys around 
the world about global attitudes of respondents. They conducted several cross-national surveys 
over the last fifteen years. The survey dataset that will be used in this research is the ‘spring 2013 
survey’ (Pew Research Center, 2013). This because it provides lots of data and this is the year 
that the polity IV project updated its map about regime type and thus fits the correct data in 2013. 
Obviously, 2013 is in the post-Cold war period, so this is also sufficient for testing the 
expectations from Huntington’s theory. This dataset consists of public opinion data from 37.653 
respondents in 39 states. The minimum of respondents was 700, in the Czech Republic and the 
maximum was 3.226 in China. The number of respondents can be seen per state in table A in the 
appendix. The total amount of questions was 182, but not all questions are used in this thesis. 
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From this data seven questions are used as dependent variables. The first questions that 
were taken, read: ‘Please tell me if you have a favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of: a) the United States; c) China; d) Iran; e) Russia; m) 
India’ (Pew Research Center, 2013). These questions were asked to respondents from all 39 
states, except the questions about India and Russia which were only submitted to respondents 
from 21 states. With these questions the dyadic expectations stemming from the research 
question can be tested. In the states that were the topic, there are democratic states (like the U.S. 
and India), and nondemocratic states (China, Iran, Russia). Furthermore, these are also states 
from several different civilizations. The U.S. is from the Western civilization, Iran from the 
Islamic civilization, Russia from the Eastern Orthodox civilization and India from the Hindu 
civilization. So this will provide evidence to see how the public from the same or different 
civilization with the same or different regime type perceives another state as favorable or not. For 
this research, a dichotomous variable was created, so ‘favorable’ and ‘somewhat favorable’ are 
taken together, as well as ‘somewhat unfavorable’ and ‘very unfavorable’. This due to practical 
reasons for the usage of the chi-square test. 
 However, there has to be placed a comment here. Favorability is a kind of general term. It 
is not sure what the respondent specifically had in mind when answering this question, as is 
always difficult in surveys. Did the respondents assumed more on military-strategic aspects, or 
more on economic relations? Or did they interpret favorability mostly by, for example, economic 
relations. This is always a problem in surveys with closed questions (Bryman, 2012, p. 249). 
Because this is not specified by the Pew Research Center or in the question itself, there can only 
be assumed that the whole picture of the state was taken into account by the respondent. So 
included military assessments as well as economics or other considerations. Given this, it can be 
used to interpret the expectations. Respondents from a democratic state will probably perceive 
another democratic state as more favorable, given the total picture, than they will perceive a 
nondemocratic state. Respondents from different civilizations and the states that are on a fault 
line will probably perceive states that are not from the same civilization as more unfavorable. 
         Another question that will be included from the Pew Research Center dataset (2013) is 
about possible international concerns: ‘Do you think that a. China’s; b. the United States’ power 
and influence is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?’.  
This question is sort of the same measurement as the favorability question, but with more 
emphasis on the assessment of the aggressiveness of a foreign state. It resembles the favorability 
question, but then in a slightly other way and only for the United States and China. Therefore, 
this variable can give us another indication for the research question and there can be seen if the 
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results of these variables differ very much from each other. For this research, ‘major threat’ and 
‘minor threat’ are taken together under the single term ‘threat’, so that respondents either 
perceive a state as a threat or not.  
With these questions, it can be examined how the public from, for example, an 
authoritarian state of the Islamic world, perceives a democratic state in the Western World. Or 
how the public from a Western democratic state, views another democratic state in the Hindu 
civilization. Also, we can find states that are on the fault lines of civilizations, and see if they are 
more aggressive in general than states that are not. With these datasets we can test the 
expectations. As stressed earlier, all the states that were surveyed in this dataset will be recoded 
into different independent variables according to their regime type, civilization membership and 
whether they are on a fault line or not with the particular state in the question. This is shown in 
table A in the appendix. 
However, not all combinations were met. The respondents only gave their perceptions 
about five different states. From these there are two democratic states, three nondemocratic states 
and five different civilizations. So the results are only based on these states. The amount of 
combinations that were made are in table A in the appendix as well. India and Iran are not in the 
table, because those states weren’t surveyed. Therefore their combinations will be given here: 
India is in the Hindu civilization and is a democratic state. It has a combination with 24 
democratic states, 15 nondemocratic states and with 39 states from other civilizations. It is on a 
fault line with 2 states from different civilizations. Iran is a nondemocratic state in the Islamic 
civilization. The respondents that have to perceive Iran are also from 24 democratic states, 15 
nondemocratic states. For Iran, 9 states are from the same civilization and 30 are from another 
civilization. There are no states from different civilizations on a fault line with Iran. 
Somehow, in Huntington’s map in the translated book from 1997, Pakistan, Indonesia and 
Malaysia are not included in the Islamic civilization (Huntington, 1997, p. 22-23). However, 
since Huntington stresses that the most important factor in determining a state’s civilization 
membership is dominant religion, in this thesis these three states will be regarded as part of the 
Islamic civilization, because the World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016abc) tells us 
that these states are mostly Islamic. In Indonesia, 87,2% are Muslim in 2010, in Malaysia 61,3% 
and in Pakistan 96,4%. 
The survey data are based on random telephone interviews and face-to-face interviews. 
The face-to-face interviews were held on adults only and in different regions and cities across the 
surveyed state. The results are national samples. The telephone interviews were sampled with a 
Random Digit Dial probability sample. These were thus only conducted at people who have a cell 
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phone, which could be a slight bias. Following the Pew Research Center dataset, it can be said for 
95% certainty that the error which can be attributed to sampling or other unforeseen random 
effects is plus or minus the margin of error (Pew Research Center, 2013). So, for these reasons 
the results can be seen as the public opinion of the given state within the margin of error. The 
sample size and the margin of error will be listed for each state in table A in the appendix. 
 
Analysis: 
The Pearson’s chi-square test is used to see the significance of the independent variables. This 
test examines whether there is a correlation between two categorical variables (Field, 2014, p. 
721). If the chi-square value is met and is significant, this means that the two variables are related 
and that the difference in percentages between for example democratic or nondemocratic 
regimes, is not due to chance but due to this categorization. Therefore, cross tables are made 
which give the percentages per category for the answers to the question. In all the cross tables 
that will be used, there is 1 degree of freedom. For this degree of freedom the chi-square value 
must be higher than 3,84 to be significant, because that value applies to a probability (p) of less 
than 0,05. This means that there can be said that the expectation is met for 95% certainty (Field, 
2014, p. 898). 
Table 1: U.S. favorability or 
unfavorability: 
Favorable 
(%): 
Unfavo- 
rable (%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
70,4 
46,1 
29,6 
53,9 
2057,55 ,000 
Civilization 
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
71,4 
56,2 
28,6 
43,8 
699,795 ,000 
Fault line: On a fault line: 
Not on fault line: 
63,6 
60,5 
36,4 
39,5 
7,053 ,008 
 
Table 2: U.S. perceived as threat or 
no threat to respondent’s own state 
Threat 
(%): 
No threat 
(%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance: 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
60,7 
73,2 
39,3 
26,8 
578,996 ,000 
Civilization 
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
56,8 
69,5 
43,2 
30,5 
529,339 ,000 
Fault line: On a fault line: 
Not on fault line: 
77,3 
65,0 
22,7 
35,0 
119,035 ,000 
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First the variables about the United States. To see the combinations that are made for this 
question, see table A in the appendix. The states from different civilizations that lie on a fault line 
with the U.S. are Russia and Mexico. As can be seen in table 1, respondents from democratic 
states are more favorable of the United States with 70,4 % than respondents that aren’t, namely 
46,1 %. The chi-square value equated 2057,55 at p < 0,001, so for this variable, there is a 
significant association between regime type and whether or not the respondents perceive the U.S. 
as favorable or unfavorable. 
For civilization membership, nearly the same thing can be said. Although respondents that 
aren’t from the Western civilization are generally more favorable than unfavorable of the U.S., 
this differs significantly from the respondents from the Western civilization. The chi-square test 
gives as result a value of 699,795 and this value is again very significant (p<0,001). For the fault 
line expectation, the difference in percentages between states that are on a fault line with the U.S. 
and states that are not, is not that large. However, the chi-square value exceeds the critical value 
of 3,841 at 7,053. This is significant at p<0,01, but just slightly less significant than regime type 
or civilization membership.  
 For the question about the possible threat the U.S. might pose on the respondent’s own 
state, the expectations are met as well with the chi-square tests. Most respondents view the U.S. 
as more of a threat than not as can be seen in table 2, but there are differences in these 
perceptions per category. For regime type, the difference between respondents from democratic 
states and nondemocratic states is significant with a chi-square value of 578,999 at p<0,001. 
Therefore, it matters if a respondent is part of a democratic state or a nondemocratic state. For 
civilization membership, the same can be said. The value here was 529,339 at p<0,001, and this 
categorization was highly significant. For the fault line variable, the chi-square value is 119,035 
for p<0,001, which means that this variable is also significant.  
Overall, for both questions it significantly differs for the respondents to be in the 
categories that were created according to our expectations. Respondents from states that are 
either nondemocratic, not from the Western civilization or on a fault line with the U.S. perceive 
the U.S. as less favorable and more as a threat. If a respondent is from a democratic state, from 
the Western civilization or from a state that is not on a fault line with the U.S., they are more 
likely to perceive the U.S. as favorable or as no threat. So in perceiving the favorability and threat 
perception of the U.S., all the expectations are reflected in the data. 
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Table 3: China favorability or 
unfavorability 
Favorable 
(%): 
Unfavo- 
rable (%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
54,1 
75,1 
45,9 
24,9 
1542,982 ,000 
Civilization  
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
87,9 
59,4 
12,1 
40,6 
1214,654 ,000 
Fault line: On a fault line: 
Not on fault line: 
60,0 
63,0 
40,0 
37,0 
11,785 ,001 
 
Table 4: China perceived as threat or 
no threat to respondent’s own state 
Threat 
(%): 
No threat 
(%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance: 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
71,8 
50,9 
28,2 
49,1 
1567,267 ,000 
Civilization 
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
64,9 
63,4 
35,1 
36,6 
3,433 ,064 
Fault line: On a fault line: 
Not on fault line: 
66 
63,3 
34 
36,7 
9,584 ,002 
 
Next, there will be examined if the same thing can be said for China. China is a 
nondemocratic state in the Chinese civilization as can be seen in table A in the appendix, as well 
as the combinations that were made. Table 3 reveals that when accounting for regime type, there 
is a significant difference between respondents from democratic or nondemocratic regimes, 
because the chi-square value is 1542,982 for p<0,001. When looking at the percentages, this 
means that respondents from democratic states are statistically less inclined to perceive China as 
favorable, than respondents from nondemocratic states would. When accounting for civilization 
membership, the same can be stressed about the data. Respondents from the same civilization are 
more likely to perceive China as favorable than unfavorable. The chi-square value is significant 
at p<0.001. The fault line assumption gives slightly less significant results. Respondents are more 
likely to be favorable of China when they are not on a civilizational fault line, than states that are. 
This is still very significant for a chi-square value of 11,785, p<0,01.  
 The question about whether China is perceived as a threat or no threat to the respondent’s 
own state, provides again evidence for expectation 1. Respondents from democratic states are 
more inclined to perceive China as a threat than respondents from nondemocratic states. The chi-
square value is 1567,267 at p<0,001 indicating for a highly significant association. The 
civilization membership expectation isn’t significant for this variable about China. The chi-
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square value is 3,433, which is just below 3,481 at p>0,5. Again the fault line indication is 
significant with a value of 9,584 at p<0,01. This means that respondents from states that lie on a 
civilizational fault line, are more likely to perceive China as a threat, than were respondents from 
other states. This meets expectation 3.  
 So the questions about China provide evidence for expectation 1 and 3. Expectation 2 
about civilization membership was met in the question about the favorability of China, but not in 
the question about China as a threat or not. Therefore this expectation isn’t reflected well enough 
in these variables about China. 
Table 5: Iran favorability or 
unfavorability 
Favorable 
(%): 
Unfavo- 
rable (%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
24,3 
37,6 
75,7 
62,4 
639,546 ,000 
Civilization 
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
43,8 
25,0 
56,2 
75,0 
977,972 ,000 
 
 The next question is about Iran. Iran has no fault lines with states from other civilizations 
in this survey. From table 5, there can be argued that most respondents from democratic and 
nondemocratic regimes as well as from the Islamic civilization as other civilizations, perceive 
Iran generally as more unfavorable. However, respondents from democratic regimes are more 
likely to perceive Iran as unfavorable, due to a lower percentage for ‘favorable’ and a higher 
percentage for ‘unfavorable’. This is significant, because the chi-square value is 639,546 at 
p<0,001. The same is true for civilization membership. Respondents from other civilizations are 
more inclined to perceive Iran as unfavorable than states from the Islamic civilization would. 
This is true because the chi-square value is 977,972 at p<0,001. So expectation 1 and 2 are 
reflected in the data from this dependent variable. 
Table 6: Russia favorability or 
unfavorability 
Favorable 
(%): 
Unfavo- 
rable (%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
44,7 
49,7 
55,3 
50,3 
74,493 ,000 
Civilization 
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
75,8 
44,8 
24,2 
55,2 
693,078 ,000 
Fault line: On a fault line: 
Not on fault line: 
45,5 
47,0 
54,5 
53 
3,603 ,058 
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 The results from the question about Russia can be seen in table 6. The regime type 
expectation is reflected in the data, because the difference in percentages between respondents 
from democratic and nondemocratic states significantly differed for a chi-square value of 74,493 
at p<0,001. This means that a respondent is significantly more likely to perceive Russia as 
unfavorable if the respondent is from a democratic state than from a nondemocratic state. The 
same is true for civilization membership, because respondents from other civilizations perceived 
Russia as more unfavorable and less favorable than respondents from the same civilizations. The 
chi-square test gives a value of 693,078 (p<0.058), so this is highly significant. The fault line 
expectation is not reflected in this variable. Respondents from states from different civilizations 
that are on a fault line did perceive Russia as more unfavorable than states that aren’t, but this 
was due to random chance, because the chi-square value is 3,603, which is less than 3,84. This 
indicates for no correlation. 
Table 7: India favorability or 
unfavorability 
Favorable 
(%): 
Unfavo- 
rable (%): 
Chi-square 
value: 
Chi-square 
significance 
Regime type: Democratic: 
Nondemocratic: 
58,9 
42,5 
41,1 
57,5 
416,319 ,000 
Civilization 
membership: 
Same civilization: 
Other civilization: 
- 
52,0 
- 
48,0 
- - 
Fault line: On a fault line: 
Not on fault line: 
29,7 
58,8 
70,3 
41,2 
965,289 ,000 
 
India is a democratic state in the Hindu civilization. Expectation 1 is met in this data. 
Respondents from democratic states perceive India as more favorable and less unfavorable than 
nondemocratic states, because the percentage for democratic regime type is higher than from 
nondemocratic regime type. This categorization is significant for a chi-square value of 416,319 at 
p<0,001. Because there are no other states from the Hindu civilization in this survey, the 
civilization membership cannot be tested for India. The fault line expectation is reflected in the 
data about India. Respondents from states that are on a fault line with India, perceived it as less 
favorable and more unfavorable, than states that weren’t. With a chi-square value of 965,289 this 
is highly significant at p<0,001. So expectation 1 and 3 are met in this variable. 
 Summing up all these results, it can be argued that regime type gives a more sufficient 
explanation for the public perception of a state about a foreign state than civilization membership. 
In all dependent variables, the regime type categorization gave the results that would be expected 
from the expectation. Respondents from democratic states are more likely to perceive another 
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democratic state as ‘favorable’ or as ‘no threat’ than respondents from nondemocratic states do. 
In perceiving a nondemocratic state, respondents from democratic states are more likely to 
perceive it as ‘unfavorable’ or a ‘threat’ than respondents from nondemocratic states. This 
association is found significant for all the dependent variables used in this research. 
 The civilization membership variable is met in table 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, but not in table 4. 
Therefore, there can be argued at any rate that this categorization is less sufficient than regime 
type for explaining the public opinion of another state. Still, the expectation about civilization 
membership was reflected in five tables. This is significant for all these five tables, according to 
the chi-square tests. So the expectation would not completely be overturned by this data, but 
since it wasn’t consistent for all the dependent variables it is still less sufficient than regime type. 
The fault line expectation was met in five out of six tables, meaning that there was a significant 
association between the fault line categorization and the perception of states. However, just as 
with civilization membership, there is one table where the expectation isn’t met. Therefore, it can 
be argued for this categorization as well, that it is less sufficient for explaining public opinion 
about foreign states. 
 
Conclusion: 
In this bachelor thesis, cross-national public opinion data has been examined to see whether 
regime type could give a more sufficient explanation for the perception of a state about a foreign 
state than civilization membership. So could democratic peace theory provide the best 
explanation for the perception by the public of one state about another state, or does the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ theory by Huntington provide the best explanation? The level of analysis was the 
public opinion and three expectations were derived from this question to find evidence.  
 In sum, the expectation from democratic peace theory that the public from democratic 
states will perceive other democratic states as more peaceful than other states, is reflected in the 
results from the data. There is a significant correlation between regime type and the dependent 
variables in perceiving foreign states regarding their favorability or their possible threat. The 
civilization categorization from Huntington could provide some agreement with the data, but in 
one case there wasn’t a correlating association. The expectation about the fault lines, also 
stemming from Huntington, isn’t reflected in one dependent variable either. For these reasons, 
regime type gives a more sufficient explanation for the public perception of a state about another 
state than civilization membership, because the data gives a significant correlation for all the 
dependent variables in relation with regime type. 
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 Unfortunately, there are some limitations of this study. The survey data came only from 
39 states. Furthermore, there were only 5 states where the respondents had to give their opinion 
about. These were two democratic states, three nondemocratic states and they were from five 
different civilizations. So not all civilizations are reflected in this research and a lot of democratic 
and nondemocratic states weren’t used either. Moreover, it isn’t quite sure what the respondents 
specifically had in mind when answering questions about ‘favorability’ or ‘threat’. This is a 
common problem in surveys with closed questions. 
That is why the assumptions of democratic peace theory and the clash of civilizations 
about public opinion of foreign states can’t be rejected or accepted. It can only be argued that the 
assumption of democratic peace theory is more reflected in the data that was used in this 
research. A potential gap for future research would be to gather more public opinion data, from 
more states, specifically with questions regarding foreign states or about war and peace relations. 
Then, it can be more clear what assumption or expectation is the best. But hopefully this research 
filled up a tiny gap in the democratic peace literature. 
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Appendix:  
 
Table A: State 
categorization 
Civilization 
membership 
Regime 
type 
Sample 
size 
Margin of 
error 
(%points) 
Combinations with 
(only for states that 
are in the question)  
Australia Western Democratic 800 4.4  
Britain Western Democratic 1012 3.3  
Canada Western Democratic 701 3.7  
Czech 
Republic 
Western Non- 
democratic 
700 3.7  
France Western Democratic 1004 3.6  
Germany Western Democratic 1025 4.1  
Israel Western Democratic 922 4.6  
Italy Western Democratic 1105 4.1  
Philippines Western Democratic 804 4.5  
Poland Western Democratic 800 3.9  
Spain Western Democratic 1000 3.1  
United States Western Democratic 1002 3.5 Democratic: 23 
Nondemocratic: 15 
Same civilization: 11 
Other civilization: 27 
Fault line: 2 
No fault line: 36 
Greece Eastern- 
orthodox 
Democratic 1000 3.7  
Russia Eastern- 
orthodox 
Non- 
democratic 
996 3.6 Democratic: 24 
Nondemocratic: 13 
Same civilization: 1 
Other civilization: 37 
Fault line: 4 
No fault line: 34 
Egypt Islamic Non- 
democratic 
1000 4.3  
Indonesia Islamic Non- 
democratic 
1000 4.0  
Jordan Islamic Non- 
democratic 
1000 4.5  
Lebanon Islamic Non- 1000 4.0  
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democratic 
Malaysia Islamic Non- 
democratic 
822 4.3  
Pakistan Islamic Non- 
democratic 
1201 4.3  
Palestinian 
territories 
Islamic Non- 
democratic 
810 4.4  
Tunisia Islamic Non- 
democratic 
1000 4.0  
Turkey Islamic Democratic 1000 7.7  
China Chinese Non- 
democratic 
3226 3.5 Democratic: 24 
Nondemocratic: 13 
Same civilization: 1  
Other civilization: 37 
Fault line: 4 
No fault line: 34 
South-Korea Chinese Democratic 809 3.7  
Japan Japanese Democratic 700 4.3  
Argentina Latin-
American 
Democratic 819 4.7  
Bolivia Latin-
American 
Non- 
democratic 
800 4.5  
Brazil Latin-
American 
Democratic 960 4.1  
Chile Latin-
American 
Democratic 800 5.2  
El Salvador Latin-
American 
Democratic 792 5.3  
Mexico Latin-
American 
Democratic 1000 4.1  
Venezuela Latin-
American 
Non- 
democratic 
1000 3.5  
Ghana African Democratic 799 4.7  
Kenya African Democratic 798 4.3  
Nigeria African Non- 
democratic 
1031 4.0  
Senegal African Democratic 800 4.1  
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South Africa African Democratic 815 4.1  
Uganda African Non- 
democratic 
800 4.3  
 
